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维基百科，自由的百科全书
什葉派新月帶，圖中數字為什葉派信徒佔該國人口的比例

什葉派新月帶（英語：Shia Crescent或Shiite Crescent），又稱什葉派之弧（Shia Arc）及什葉派走廊（Shia Corridor），是指中東地區一條大多數人皈依什葉派，或國內存在具影響力的什葉派少數民族的新月形地帶。該地帶有黎巴嫩、敘利亞、伊拉克、伊朗、亞塞拜然、西阿富汗、葉門和巴林，其中伊朗、巴林、伊拉克及亞塞拜然的什葉派信徒佔人口過半[1]。其內的教派除了十二伊玛目派之外，還包括伊斯瑪儀派、阿拉维派、阿拉维派與阿列维派[2]。

隨著伊朗近年來致力整合所有什葉派穆斯林，什葉派新月帶已開始被用來代指受伊朗影響或控制的地區。另一方面，這術語亦顯示什葉派在中東的政治影響力日益月滋[2]。

概述[编辑]

什葉派新月帶這詞由約旦國王阿卜杜拉二世在2004年11月接受NBC新聞主持克里斯·馬修斯（英语：Chris Matthews）的訪問時首創，擔心伊朗會利用伊拉克的什葉派勢力、其在該國的社會影響力以及與艾哈迈德·沙拉比和阿里·西斯塔尼的之間的關係，去干預2005年1月伊拉克国民议会选举的前期準備工作[3]。他指控伊朗官方鼓勵其人民越境進入伊拉克參與投票，透過民意調查影響後續的選舉結果，又在中間人的幫助下向失業的伊拉克提供慰問金等福利，企圖藉此建立親伊朗的公眾輿論。部分入境的伊朗人更受過伊斯蘭革命衛隊的訓練，有為選舉過後的伊拉克製造麻煩的可能性[4]。當時在遜尼派威脅，最後也真的杯葛選舉的背景下，伊拉克有可能出現由什葉派主導的政府，並受同屬一教派的伊朗影響。而共同的宗教會大力推進伊朗、伊拉克、由阿拉維派掌權的敘利亞和在黎巴嫩政治上有著舉足輕重影響力的什葉派民兵組織真主黨之間的潛在合作，後三者甚至可能成為伊朗在中東權力博弈中的代理人，從而改變兩大伊斯蘭教派的勢力平衡[4]。

如果伊拉克由什葉派掌權，並且與伊朗具特殊關係的話，那麼加上敘利亞和黎巴嫩真主黨，我們就能看到一條新形成、勢將動搖到海灣國家們，甚至整個（中東）地區的弧月形地帶。
“
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約旦國王阿卜杜拉二世在2004年接受MSNBC採訪[5]

The term has developed since to encompass other Shia areas of the Middle East. The nations where Shia Muslims form a dominant majority are Iran and Iraq. Shias also represent a large majority in Azerbaijan, however it is constitutionally a secular state.[6] Those who are actual practicing adherents are much lower,[7] which has led to them generally being excluded from the crescent.[8] Shia are also the majority of citizens in Bahrain, however the government is largely Sunni.[8] Large Shia minorities also exist in Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and to a lesser extent, UAE. Excepting Lebanon, where the weak central government structure of Lebanon has allowed Hezbollah to become involved in the Syrian civil war,[9] these are not usually described as part of the crescent.

Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a speech on June 5, 2005, on the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, cited the "Shia Crescent" project as evidence of a policy of religious divisiveness.[10] In 29th International Islamic Unity Conference in Tehran on December 27, 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on Muslim countries to unite and strive to improve Islam’s public image, adding that "There is neither a Shiite nor a Sunni crescent. We have an Islamic moon. We, Muslims, are in a world where we must be united".[11] Noam Chomsky, an American university professor and linguist, in his book, Making the Future, Occupations, Interventions, Empire, and Sustainability, claims that most of the Middle East's energy reserves lie in the so-called "Shiite Crescent" Iran's influence in the Shiite Crescent challenges US efforts to control Middle East energy resources.[12] Washington's nightmare is for a Shiite coalition to take control of the world's most important oil reserves independently of the United States.[13]

In January 2016, a confidant of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman claimed that the Arab world was confronted "by a Shia full moon”, rather than just a Shia Crescent, as a result of the expanded activities of Iranian-backed Shia militias in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.[14] In December 2017, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said that "Today, armed cells of resistance have been established in Islamic countries, and small networks of resistance have been created in other countries, and we will see their influence in the future.” According to him, large forces of volunteers have joined the "anti-terror" struggle in Syria.[15] Jafari had also previously talked about the regime's need to create a Shia Islamist bloc loyal to Iran.[16]

時任聖城軍指揮官卡西姆·蘇萊曼尼在2014年概述了哈米尼如何利用伊朗官方撐腰的霍梅尼主义武裝分子發動軍事叛亂，推翻阿拉伯國家政府的戰略，當解釋到伊朗的目標是掌控「世界70%的石油」時，他表示：

「在伊朗領導之下的什葉派復興創造了兩極分化，也壯大了伊朗本身，而這已經過政治、安全和經濟方面的考量……我們知道伊朗、伊拉克與沙烏地阿拉伯控制了世界上大部分的石油，（沙烏地）阿拉伯排在老大、兩伊則分別屈居第二和第三，然後世界上大概70到80%的石油產自什葉派穆斯林的居住地。伊拉克的石油走廊在巴斯拉至巴格達之間；科威特及（沙烏地）阿拉伯的油田集中在达曼和卡提夫等什葉派聚居地，對伊朗來說亦然。什葉派的政治領導力大大增強了伊朗的民族力量。」[17]

人口轉變與什葉化[编辑]

In 2017 or later, Hussain Ibrahim Qutrib, an Associate Professor of Geomorphology at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, wrote an article about the demographic changes that have occurred in "Useful Syria" as a result of the Syrian Civil War.[18] Specifically, Qutrib defined "Useful Syria" similar to how Syrian President Bashar al-Assad defined this term in early 2016—as in, including the Syrian governorates of Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Tartus.[18] Qutrib pointed out that these six governorates contained 46% of Syria's total population at the end of 2011—as in, 9.8 million people out of a total Syrian population of almost 21.4 million people at that point in time.[18] Qutrib points out that, at the end of 2011, the demographics of "Useful Syria" were 69% Sunni, 21% Alawite (which is an offshoot of Shi'a Islam), 1% Shi'a, 1% Druze, 2% Ismaili, and 6% Christian.[18]

相比之下，「有用的敘利亞」內的人口到了2016年已從980萬下降到760萬，其人口結構在這五年間也發生了顯著的變化：52%遜尼派、24%阿拉維派、13%什葉派、7%基督宗教、3%伊斯瑪儀派和1%德魯茲教，而最突出的主要變化在於從1%爆炸性增長至13%的什葉派穆斯林[18]。在2011年至2016件間，大馬士革農村省和霍姆斯省的人口變化尤其明顯，前者的遜尼派比例從87%雪崩式下降到54%，後者亦不惶多讓，從64%一瀉千里至21%[18]。格塔里布將此現象將之為「什葉化」（Shiization）[18]。

參見[编辑]

什葉派條目
地理條目

參考資料[编辑]

  1. ^ Mudhoon, Loay. Die Hisbollah in der arabischen Misstrauensfalle. Deutsche Welle. 2006-07-23 [2021-11-02] （德语）. 
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 Muhammad Reza, Yusefi; Mohammadali, Rezaee Esfahani. Objectives of Islamic Awakening in Quran's Viewpoint. Islamic Revolution Research (Ministry of Science, Research and Technology of Iran). 2013, 10 (33) （波斯语）. 
  3. ^ Hardball with Chris Matthews:King Abdullah II of Jordan. NBC News. 7 December 2008. 
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran. The Washington Post. 8 December 2004. 
  5. ^ Jordan’s Abdullah concerned Iraq may tilt toward Tehran. NBC News. 2004-12-09 [2024-06-09]. 
  6. ^ Religion (PDF). Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan: 2. 1992. 
  7. ^ Azerbaijan. CIA Factbook. 9 May 2023. 
  8. ^ 8.0 8.1 Emerging Shia "Crescent" of Power in the Core of the Middle East. Gulf/2000 Project. 2009. 
  9. ^ Analysis - Hezbollah's Syria victory risks wider Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. Reuters. 6 June 2013. 
  10. ^ بیانات در مراسم بیست و ششمین سالگرد رحلت امام خمینی (رحمه‌الله) [Statements of the Ceremony of the 26th Anniversary of the Death of Imam Khomeini (May Allah Have Mercy on Him)]. farsi.khamenei.ir. 2015-06-04 [2021-11-02] （波斯语）. 
  11. ^ Iran's Rouhani urges Muslim countries to unite. Euronews. December 27, 2015. 
  12. ^ Chomsky 2012，第84–86頁
  13. ^ Chomsky 2012，第266頁
  14. ^ Muhammad bin Salman gambles on intervention abroad and radical economic change at home. But forget about democracy. The Economist. 9 January 2016 [14 January 2016]. 
  15. ^ Iran: We have established 'resistance cells' across Middle East - Middle East. Israel National News. 
  16. ^ Kazemzadeh, Masoud. 5:The sources of the Middle East's crises and American grand strategy. Iran's Foreign Policy: Elite Factionalism, Ideology, the Nuclear Weapons Program, and the United States. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. 2020: 75–77. ISBN 978-0-367-49545-9. 
  17. ^ Kazemzadeh, Masoud. 5:The sources of the Middle East's crises and American grand strategy. Iran's Foreign Policy: Elite Factionalism, Ideology, the Nuclear Weapons Program, and the United States. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. 2020: 78. ISBN 978-0-367-49545-9. 
  18. ^ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 Qutrib, Hussain Ibrahim. “Useful Syria” and Demographic Changes in Syria (pdf) (报告). Riyadh: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. 2016 [2024-06-07]. 

書籍[编辑]

外部連結[编辑]

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